Verification Checklist | Bitcoin System Constitution

Exit Rights

Downward exit (L3→L2, L2→L1) exists as a non-discretionary right, not a favor Art. IX.1

No committee, operator group, or governance body exercises discretionary control over normal downward movement Art. IX.3

No identity-based approval required for downward exit within the protocol Art. IX.2

No insider class has privileged withdrawal rights over ordinary users Art. IX.4

Functional exit blocking (excessive fees, delays, identity gates) treated the same as structural blocking Art. IX.8

Normal downward movement has a constitutional maximum delay of 12 Bitcoin blocks Art. XVII.11

Layer 2 remains workable even if Bitcoin Layer 1 never changes Art. IX.6

Reserve Truth & Liability Truth

Any direct claim on Bitcoin is provable without trusting the issuer Art. XIII.1

Both reserves AND total outstanding liabilities are publicly verifiable Art. XIII.3-4

Encumbered reserves are explicitly disclosed and not counted as free backing Art. XIII.5

Reserves backing direct Bitcoin claims are unencumbered by default Art. XIII.7

A published proof cadence exists with a declared maximum lag Art. XIII.10-11

Proofs are timestamped, publicly accessible, and independently verifiable Art. XIII.12

Missed proof cadences result in claims being marked as stale or unproven Art. XIII.13-14

Custody Independence

No single key can move, spend, or encumber reserves backing direct claims or L2 balances Art. XIV.1.2

No single entity holds exclusive custody over such reserves Art. XIV.1.3

Signing authority is distributed across independent control domains Art. XIV.1.4

Reserve custody structure is publicly disclosed (control model, jurisdictional distribution, failure modes) Art. XIV.1.6

No custody change weakening the model takes effect without public notice and an exit window Art. XIV.1.8

Signer admission is public and rule-based, not incumbent-discretionary Art. XIV.2.3

If provisional custody, it is publicly disclosed, capped, and has a maturity timeline Art. XIV.2.6-7

Credit Distinction

Bitcoin, direct claims, utility balances, and credit are categorically separated Art. XII.1

No credit instrument is represented, marketed, or labeled as Bitcoin or a direct claim Art. XII.2

Lending, rehypothecation, or yield-bearing instruments are visibly and permanently labeled as credit Art. XII.3

Holders can always tell whether they hold Bitcoin, a claim, a utility balance, or credit Art. XII.6

Layer 2 does not require acceptance of credit instruments as money substitutes Art. XII.5

Censorship Resistance

No sustained discretionary suppression of valid ordinary transactions based on identity or politics Art. X.1

Architecture preserves a practical path to inclusion for valid transactions Art. X.4

Economic coercion and incentive-based suppression are treated as censorship Art. X.8

Spam resistance rules are published, identity-blind, and generally applied Art. X.5

Privacy

Users can transact, exit, and move between layers without unnecessary identity exposure Art. XI.1

Surveillance is not a neutral default — it requires specific constitutional justification Art. XI.3

No identity disclosure required for ordinary transactions or normal downward exit Art. XI.5

Data collection beyond constitutional necessity is disclosed and limited Art. XI.7-8

Governance Limits

Constitutional amendments end no later than 5 years from constitutional genesis Art. XIX.4

Governance authority ends at year 25 Art. XIX.6-7

All approved changes fully implemented by year 30, then full ossification Art. XIX.8-9

No extension mechanisms for any governance window Art. XIX.10

Governance tokens (if any) exist only on Layer 3, not Layer 2 Art. XX.1-2

Pre-declared authority is specific and fixed before amendment window closes Art. XIX.15

Monetary Integrity

Bitcoin supply is never altered by Layer 2 or Layer 3 accounting Art. V.1

Expanded divisibility is not treated as expanded supply Art. V.2

Dust and remainder balances do not silently disappear Art. VIII.4

Layer 2 prohibits speculative tokens, complex DeFi, hidden leverage, and fractional reserve behavior Art. VII

Operational Decentralization

Architecture favors decreasing central dependency over time Art. XXIV.1

No single actor, company, or jurisdiction can practically gate ordinary L2 operation or exit Art. XXIV.3

Concentration of choke functions (ordering, custody, proof generation, bridging) is evaluated Art. XXIV.5

Concentration reports published at least every 90 days OIS §5.3

Recoverability & Independence

No silent changes to derivation paths, recovery logic, or wallet mapping for existing balances Art. XXV.2

Recovery-critical metadata is exportable in open, vendor-independent form Art. XXV.5

Delegated control is revocable without delegate cooperation Art. XXVI.2-3

Recovery is possible even if daily operators disappear, are captured, or refuse service SSAS §4.3

No single operator or service is the only path to recovery SSAS §4.4

User Clarity & UX

Users can always distinguish what they hold (BTC, claim, utility balance, gas token, credit) Art. XXVIII

Risk warnings are shown in plain language before committing value to new trust contexts UX §1

No dark patterns — no deceptive defaults, prechecked opt-ins, or buried exit options UX §5

Self-custody is at least as visually accessible as custodial alternatives UX §10

Compliance context is disclosed (compliant, partially compliant, non-compliant, or out of scope) UX §9